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Abstract 
We build a structural model to understand the fine set in court, which is described as the 
outcome of a two-stage game between defendant, public prosecutor and judge. The 
equilibrium fine depends on the harm caused, the costs to society and the probability that 
the guilty party is punished. This fine influences the severity of prosecution and the 
defence expenditures. Next we empirically analyse the fines pronounced by the Court of 
Appeal in Ghent (Belgium) for water related criminal offences. We investigate whether 
the seriousness of the violation and past convictions, as well as some other characteristics, 
increase the penalty.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Without a proper monitoring and enforcement policy environmental legislation remains an 
empty chest. An essential decision factor for firms deciding on compliance is the sanction 
they can expect if they get caught. Our main objective is to understand which factors 
determine the stringency of fines. We follow a two-step approach. First, in the second 
section, we construct a game-theoretic model to predict the level of the fines that result 
from the game between polluters, the prosecutor and the judge. The decisions on how 
much to spend on defence and prosecution by the firm and the public prosecutor 
respectively are influenced by the structure of the fine set in court. Secondly, in the third 
section, we test the theoretical model by examining fines pronounced by the Court of 
Appeal in Ghent (Belgium) during the period 1990-2000.  
Using a regression analysis we are able to empirically check two hypotheses. We find that, 
in an indirect way, actual fines increase with the seriousness of the violation. However, we 
were unable to corroborate the hypothesis that fines increase with the public prosecutor’s 
costs. Our analysis, for example, confirms that the violator’s compliance history 
influences the level of the fine. Violators with a criminal record have a significantly higher 
probability of receiving a higher penalty.  
 
1.1 Review of the theoretical literature 
Although the court trial is incorporated in previous models, see, for example, Kilgour et 
al.
2  (1992) and P’ng
3 (1983), it is not often explicitly analysed. The outcome of the court 
                                                      
2 Kilgour et al. (1992) develop and analyse simple game theoretic models of inspection and enforcement 
processes. They compare systems using administrative instruments to those relying on court determination 
of guilt.   3
game is pre-determined and the decision moment in these models falls before the actual 
verdict. In our model we start the analysis after the decision to go to court has been taken. 
The defendant and the public prosecutor have decided not to settle. 
The decisions made in court are, however, incorporated in Daughety and Reinganum 
(1995). They model both the settlement and the litigation process, allowing for incomplete 
information about the damages incurred by the plaintiff on the part of both the defendant 
and the court. The model is used to examine the effect of making settlement demands 
admissible as evidence in court (currently inadmissible) should a case proceed to trial. 
This model is closely related to our model. However, the authors consider damages paid 
by the defendant to the plaintiff. We deviate in two respects from this formula. We allow 
for punitive sanctions and we do not assume that any money is paid to the victim. The 
revenues from fines go directly to the federal government. Finally, Polinsky and Shavell 
(1998) made an extensive economic analysis of the optimal level of punitive damages in a 
variety of circumstances. We make use of their insights in order to obtain optimal 
deterrence by setting fines.  
The results we obtain are in line with previous literature. However, the game theoretical 
setting of the court game with three players and two stages is not previously used. 
Moreover, we model the game within the civil law tradition while previous literature was 
based on the common law tradition. These law traditions differ significantly with respect 
to how judge-made law is justified. Common law judges traditionally justify their findings 
of law by reference to precedent and social norms. Civil law judges traditionally justify 
                                                                                                                                                                
3 P’ng (1983) models strategic behaviour in litigation, how information is exploited and how the litigants' 
strategies are linked. The model derives conditions under which suit is filed, the action is settled and the 
action is tried.   4
their interpretation of a statute directly by reference to its meaning (Cooter and Ulen, 
1997). 
1.2 Review of the empirical literature 
The methodology we use is based on several studies that estimate comparable functions. A 
first example is the article of Cohen (1987), which considers the US coast guard’s 
enforcement of oil spill prevention for oil-carrying tankers and barges between 1973 and 
1977. The most important result is that the coast guard uses a negligence standard as 
opposed to a strict-liability standard in its penalty assessment. Moreover, intentional 
discharges of oil are more heavily penalised than other causes.  
Secondly, Earnhart (1997) explores enforcement responses to water-damaging accidents 
in the Czech Republic from 1988 till 1992 in order to analyse whether Czech enforcement 
responses changed in noticeable ways between the communist and the democratic political 
system. The author divides the driving factors behind penalty decisions into five 
categories: causes of accidents, measured damages, environmental factors, regional factors 
and political influence. The analysis shows significant differences
4 between the different 
regions and between the different political systems. Also the size and the cause of the 
violation influence the level of the fine. 
Oljaca et al. (1998) empirically estimate a penalty function for water quality violations of 
private firms in Georgia (US). They focus on penalties levied through consent decrees, 
which implies that they estimate a penalty function contingent on at least marginally 
                                                      
4 For instance, the liability rule guiding remediation shifts from a negligence rule in the communist period to 
strict liability rule in the democratic period. Also the preferential treatment given to military and foreign 
entities under communism was diminished during the democratic period. (Earnhart, 1997).   5
cooperative behaviour. Their analysis shows that the seriousness of infraction and the 
historical compliance records strongly influence penalty levels, while the intentionality of 
the violations and the method of discovery do not. The size of the polluting firm is also an 
important determinant of financial penalties. 
Finally, Kleit et al. (1998) study the civil penalties issued to water polluters by the 
Louisiana (US) Department of Environmental Quality in 1994. They find that penalties are 
more likely to occur, and are likely to be higher, the more severely a firm violates the 
regulation. Penalties are also likely to be higher if a firm has a previous record of 
environmental violations. Political influence, however, did not play an important role. 
These previous studies analyse civil or administrative sanctions. In this paper we examine 
the determinants of criminal fines and study different verdicts proclaimed by the judges of 
the Court of Appeal in Ghent. 
 
II.  GAME-THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section we derive some testable hypotheses concerning the factors that influence 
the criminal fine. First we describe the game we are analysing. We distinguish three 
parties: the judge, the public prosecutor and the defendant. We assume the defendant is a 
firm and not a person. Next we discuss the decisions made by each of these players. This 
allows us to formulate the properties of an equilibrium fine in this game. 
2.1 Set-up of the game 
Initially the firm i causes an extra discharge of some pollutant. These emissions lead to 
the, exogenously given, environmental harm  0, i hh   ∈ . The firm receives a certain   6
benefit bi from this extra discharge – e.g. it did not have to invest in abatement or it did not 
have to pay for disposal. For reasons of simplicity we assume that private and social 
benefits are equal. We work in a strict liability framework. The cause of the discharge 
therefore does not matter. All violations, intentional as well as accidental, are treated 
equally independent of the level of effort and prevention of the polluting firm. 
The violating firm now faces a lawsuit with a certain probability λ. This probability will 
depend in reality on the size of the environmental damage or the seriousness of the 
violation. Moreover, the probability of a lawsuit also depends on the probability of 
detection of the harm and on the fact whether the firm can be linked to the damage or not. 
Especially the latter link is often difficult to prove. However, we do not model this and 
assume that the probability λ is exogenously given. 
Remember that, if a firm faces trial, this implies that it has refused to comply at an earlier 
stage of the enforcement process. It chose to ignore warnings and notices of violation. 
When offered the choice by the prosecution, the firm also did not settle. In Shavell (1989, 
2003) we find several reasons why a case can proceed to trial. Plaintiffs might want to 
share information with the defendant in order to avoid a trial. However, they can be unable 
to establish the credibility of this information due to lack of time or lack of experience. 
Silence can also create a strategic advantage. The revelation of information may reduce its 
value because the party may be able to counter it. Finally, it is also possible that the 
plaintiffs might wish the defendant to be exposed to public scrutiny rather that just 
obtaining monetary compensation.  
Another important assumption is that the defendant is not necessarily the real wrongdoer. 
Measurement errors, uncertainties or stochastic pollution processes can cause an innocent   7
firm to stand to trial
5. Further we also assume that all players – firms, public prosecutor 
and judge – are risk neutral.  
 
Figure 1: Set-up of the game 
Once it is decided that the case goes to trial, the defendant and the public prosecution 
decide simultaneously on the funds they want to spend on, respectively, defence (Bdi) and 
prosecution (Bpi). The set-up of the game is illustrated in figure 1. The more the defendant 
wants to spend on legal representation, experts and/or tests, the lower the estimate of the 
damage that it can present in court and therefore the lower the fine. The firm takes the 
decision in order to minimise its expected costs. The more the public prosecutor spends on 
experts and/or tests, the higher the estimate and the better the proof of the damage caused. 
We assume that the public prosecutor wants to optimise social welfare or, equivalently, 
                                                      
5 For more information on stochastic pollution and measurement errors see Beavis and Walker (1983), Bose 
(1995) and Brännlund and Löfgren (1996). 
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optimise deterrence. After all, the public prosecutor cannot change the harm caused but it 
can try to deter potential future violators. With a certain probability ˆi ε , depending on Bpi, 
Bdi and hi, the firm is acquitted. For guilty firms this probability of acquittal represents 
procedural errors, the capability of the lawyers and the steadfastness of defence and 
prosecution.  
In a second and final stage, see figure 1, the judge decides on guilt of the defendant and on 
the level of the fine while taking into account the decisions made by the firm and the 
public prosecutor. The judge first decides on the question of guilt and next chooses the 
optimal fine in order to optimise deterrence. In Belgium there are no sentencing guidelines 
for environmental crimes. 
We are modelling a civil-law, inquisitorial law system. In its most pure form, according to 
Posner (1999), this system can be represented by only one searcher for evidence, which is 
a professional judge. Further, in Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) we read ‘in civil-law 
countries advocates’ first duty is to help justice and thus judges’.
6 These sources lead us to 
assume the same objective function, i.e. maximisation of social welfare, for both the 
public prosecutor and the judge. This assumption is further corroborated by the Flemish 
legal scholar and prosecutor-general to the Court of Cassation Raoul Declercq. In his 
influential contribution, he states that ‘the Public Prosecutor aims for the legality and the 
regularity of the verdicts and promotes the public interest’ (Declercq, 1999).  It is also 
important to note that public prosecutors in Belgium are appointed for life. This implies 
that they do not have to worry about keeping their job and being re-elected. 
In the following sections we solve the problem by backward induction. 
                                                      
6 Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) define advocates as agents that are specifically asked to defend a specific 
‘cause’ and give as examples both defence attorneys and prosecutors.   9
2.2 Decision on the fine by the judge 
As we mentioned before, the judge first resolves whether the defendant is guilty or 
innocent. We model this as a stochastic process. With probability  ˆi ε  the judge finds the 
defendant not guilty and with probability  ˆ 1 i ε −  the firm is considered to be responsible for 
the environmental damage caused. This probability of acquittal is based on the testimony 
presented by the defendant and the prosecution and is defined as: 
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< . An innocent firm () 0 i h =  is 
exonerated with probability ε . This upper limit is not necessarily equal to one since we 
allow for procedural errors. The probability that a guilty firm ( ) 0 i h >  is convicted 
depends on the actual environmental damage and on the resources spent by the defendant 
and the prosecution.  
In order to model the problem of the judge’s assessment process, whereby he/she 
aggregates credible evidence on the harm that was done, we rely on Daughety and 
Reinganum (2000a, 2000b). These authors show that the court’s aggregation of credible 
evidence, when described as in expression (1), is (1) strictly monotonically increasing in 
each to the submissions, (2) bounded by the minimum and the maximum of the cases 
presented, (3) unbiased in the sense that is symmetric in the evidence in both an absolute 
and proportional sense, and (4) independent of the order in which individual elements of 
the submissions are compared (Daughety and Reinganum, 2000b). For this reason, we   10
assume that the judge’s estimate of the harm caused by the defendant, if the firm was 
found liable, equals: 
()
() () () ()
1/
ˆ ,, ;
2
q q q
di di pi pi
id ip i i
hB hB
hBB hq
 +  = 
 
    ( 1 )  
with hdi the estimate of the harm presented by the defendant (see section 2.3.2), hpi the 
estimate of the harm presented by the prosecution (see section 2.3.1),  ,0 , di pi hh h  ∈ , 
' 0 di h <  and 
' 0 pi h >  and also  ] [ ,,0 qq ∈− ∞ + ∞ ≠ ; and () ( )
1
2 ˆ ,, ; 0 id ip i i d i p i hBB h h h = . This q 
can represent the breadth of the court’s interpretation of the applicable law, with a broader 
interpretation working against the defendant. In particular, q = 1 corresponds to the 
arithmetic mean of hdi and hpi,  q = 0 yields the geometric mean, q = -1 yields the 
harmonic mean, q →− ∞ yields the minimum of hdi and hpi, whileq →+ ∞ yields the 
maximum of h di and hpi (Daughety and Reinganum, 2000a). We assume that q is 
exogenously given and common knowledge. 
The judge wants socially optimal deterrence of potential environmental violations. 
Socially it is optimal to only allow for discharges if the social benefits bi exceed the social 
costs associated with this pollution. So the judge wants firms to internalise their external 
costs. Firms should only discharge emissions
7 if: 
  ( )
** . ii s p id i bh cB B λ >+ + +  
with cs equal to the costs of the trial for society and * denote equilibrium values. Examples 
of the trial costs cs are the wage of the judge, infrastructure or administrative costs.  
                                                      
7 We assume that the probability that an innocent firm is found liable is symmetric to the probability that a 
guilty firm is found in compliance. This allows us to equalise the expected values of the parameters to their 
actual values.   11
Firms, however, decide to discharge if their benefit exceeds the expected defence costs 
plus the expected fine: 
( ) ( )
* ˆ .1 id ii i bB F λε >+ − 
Therefore, in order for the firm to make the right decision and assuming an interior 
solution, we need: 
  () () ( )
** * ˆ .1 . di i i i s pi di B Fh c BB λε λ +− =+ + +  (2) 
or the socially optimal fine is:   
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We find that the equilibrium fine for a violator depends on the judge’s estimate of the 
harm caused, weighted by the inverse probability of being punished and on the costs 
caused to society (court costs and prosecution costs) weighted by the probability of being 
fined once the defendant stands to trial. This is consistent with the existing literature; see, 
for example, Polinsky and Shavell (1998) and Cohen (1987). 
2.3 Decision of the firm and the public prosecutor 
When it is certain that the case will go to court, both the firm and the prosecutor have to 
decide how much effort they will devote to this lawsuit. We do not consider the parties’ 
strategic decisions before the case actually came to trial. Furthermore, we assume that   12
there can be false positives. Some firms that are brought to court are innocent. We now 
discuss each party in turn. 
2.3.1 Decision of the public prosecutor 
We look at the decision made by the public prosecutor. The amount of resources 
committed to prosecution is determined simultaneously with the firm’s defence decision. 
The public prosecutor cannot influence the environmental quality since the harm has 
already been done. However, he can make sure that potential violators, including the 
current defendant, are deterred from causing future environmental damage. We assume, 
therefore, that the prosecution wants to optimise deterrence. This is consistent with current 
practice in Belgium (see section 2.1). Contrary to the judge’s behaviour, the public 
prosecutor does not have to any more decide about the culpability of the defendant. Since 
the firm is prosecuted, the defendant is assumed to be guilty.   
Remember that the more the public prosecutor spends, the higher the judge’s estimate of 
the environmental harm since he will have more and better test results. He will also have 
more relevant expert witnesses. Generally spoken, the quality of the prosecution will 
increase. Moreover, the probability of acquittal  ( ) ˆ ,, id ip i i B Bh ε  decreases. 
In order to optimise deterrence the following condition has to be fulfilled (see expression 
(2)):  
  () () ( )
** * ˆ .1 . di i i i s pi di B Fh c B B λε λ +− =+ + +  
Backward induction allows us to replace the equilibrium value of the fine and gives: 
  () () () ()
1/
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ˆ
2
q qq
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Optimally, the public prosecutor spends resources on prosecution until the judge’s 
estimate  ˆ
i h  of the environmental harm equals the actual damage hi caused. However, since 
the actual harm is unknown, the prosecution will use its best available estimate, e.g. the 
mean  i h %  of all damage assessments gathered during the preparation of the trial, as an 
approximation of hi. For strategic reasons, this best available estimate  i h %  is not necessarily 
the one the public prosecutor presents in court, which is  ( )
*
pi pi hB. This gives the 
following reaction function: 
  () ( ) { }
1/
** 2
q
qq
pi pi i di di hB hh B =− %  (4) 
The public prosecutor decides to spend money on prosecution until the judge’s estimate of 
the environmental harm caused equals the prosecutor’s best estimate ( ˆ
ii hh = % ).  
2.3.2 Firm 
We turn to the decision made by the defendant. The firm’s defence costs may include 
hiring a lawyer, consulting experts and gathering test results. The more funds they spend 
on defence, the lower the estimate of the harm hdi they will present to the court and the 
higher the probability of acquittal.  
The accused firm minimises the expected costs associated with the trial: 
  ( ) ˆ min 1
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ii d i B FB ε − +  
  () () ()
ˆ
ˆ min 1
ˆˆ .1 1 di
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The first order condition is:  *
ˆ 1
1
i
di
dh
dB λ
−=        ( 5 )    14
This first order condition determines the optimal amount 
*
di B  to spend on defence when 
the firm is charged with an environmental violation. We obtain the familiar result that the 
marginal cost of an extra unit spent on defence should equal the marginal benefit acquired 
through it. Remark that the optimal decision of the firm is independent of whether or not it 
is responsible for the environmental damage. 
2.3.3 Equilibrium 
The Nash equilibrium that determines the optimal amount of resources committed to 
prosecution 
*
pi B  and defence 
*
di B  is defined by the following set of equations: 
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In order to clarify the implications of this equilibrium, we look at an example. Suppose q 
= 1, which implies  () ( ) ˆ
2
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= . We chose a very simple functional form for hdi 
and hpi :  and 1
pi di
pi di
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These particular functional forms imply that, if you spend enough resources
8 (i.e. B ), you 
can present in court the environmental damage you prefer ( ) 0 pi di hh o r h = = . If you spend 
no money, then you obtain the worst result possible( ) 0 pi di ho r h h = = . 
We obtain the following result, with probability  ˆ 1 i ε −  or if the firm is not acquitted by the 
judge,  
                                                      
8 We assume that the firm and the prosecutor can always present in court any harm estimate that lies 
between 0 and h . That is they always have an amount  B available for prosecution and defence.    15
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This equilibrium is illustrated graphically in figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Equilibrium between public prosecutor and firm 
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reduces the judge’s estimate of the harm. The public prosecutor decides to spend 2
i h
B
h
%
 
on prosecuting the firm since this strategy equalises the judge’s estimate of the 
environmental harm with the prosecutor’s estimate. Both the firm and the public 
prosecutor decide to spend nothing on presenting their case to court if the maximum 
budget needed is large () 1i B B > % . 
Secondly, for large environmental damages 
2
i
h
h

> 

% , the firm chooses to present itself as 
innocent ()
* 0a n d di di hB B ==  if the maximum necessary budget is small () 2i B B ≤ % . The 
public prosecutor is limited in his response ( ) pi hh ≤  and spends B . The judge’s estimate 
is, therefore, smaller than the prosecutor’s best available estimate ˆ
2
ii
h
hh

=< 

% . This 
reduction in the resulting fine makes it worthwhile for the firm to invest in legal 
protection. For large maximum budgets ( ) 2i B B > % , it does no longer pay for the firm to 
invest in legal defence and therefore,
* 0 pi B = . The public prosecutor, however, still finds it 
optimal to invest in prosecution and 
* 21
i
pi
h
B B
h

=− 

%
.  
We now look at the equilibrium fine imposed by the judge and we assume that  ii hh = % . We 
find that budget limitations and limits to acceptable evidence with respect to damage 
caused, cause the fine to be non-optimal in cases 2 and 3. Moreover, the optimality of the 
fine pronounced by the judge depends crucially on the best available damage estimate of 
the public prosecutor. The results are presented in table 1. 
   17
  Judge’s estimate of harm ˆ
i h   Equilibrium fine 
*
i F  vs 
optimal fine i F  
Case 1  i h %  
*
ii FF =  
Case 2 
2
h
 
*
ii FF ≥  
Case 3 
2
h
 
*
ii FF <  
Case 4  i h %  
*
ii FF =  
Table 1: Equilibrium fines 
 
2.4 Discussion of the results 
This game theoretical analysis gives us the characteristics which we can expect for the 
equilibrium fine that is an outcome of the court game (see expression (3)). This 
equilibrium fine level depends on the harm caused by the violation, the costs to society 
and the probability that the guilty party will be punished.  
These results allow us to formulate testable hypotheses about the criminal court outcomes 
for environmental violations. 
Hypothesis 1: The equilibrium fine increases with the seriousness of the harm caused. 
Testing this hypothesis also allows to test whether working with a fixed fine is realistic. 
This is an assumption which is often debated in the literature.  
Hypothesis 2: The equilibrium fine increases with the costs of public prosecution. 
Hypothesis 3: The equilibrium fine increases with the social costs of a court trial. 
Hypothesis 4: The equilibrium fine increases with the probability of acquittal, if the firm is 
guilty. 
Hypothesis 5: The equilibrium fine decreases with the probability of being detected.    18
We now compare the theoretical results to what happens in reality and test the different 
hypotheses.  
 
III.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this part we want to check whether the theoretical model we derive is a realistic one. 
Due to data limitations we are only able to test the first two hypotheses formulated above. 
We investigate also the influence of the violator’s compliance history on the level of the 
fine. Analysing the other legal factors, we expect to see a strong influence of the fine level 
decided in first instance on the fine pronounced by the Court of Appeal. More specifically, 
this would imply that variables that were significant in first instance, have an additional 
influence on the level of the fine if they are also significant in the ‘appeal’ specification.  
In our theoretical analysis we did not consider two different instances: the court of first 
instance and the court of appeal. In Shavell (2004) we find the main rationale behind the 
existence of appeal courts; i.e. as a threat to judges ‘whose decisions would deviate too 
much from socially desirable ones’. Other papers discussing the existence of appeal courts 
and their interaction with lower courts are Daughety and Reinganum (2000a) and 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999). 
3.1 Determinants of the fine level  
In the literature we can distinguish four groups of determinants for the fine: 
environmental, legal, firm-specific and political factors. 
Environmental factors consist of, among others, the size of the damage, the size of the 
violation and the environment in which the discharge took place. In a legal setting the size 
of the violation is often measured in terms of the damage caused to the environment or   19
public health. The size of the violation is difficult to measure. Therefore, one often 
encounters a legal classification of crimes according to their seriousness and impact.  
Among the legal factors that influence the penalty level we find, among others,  the 
compliance history of the violator, the type of legislation that was violated and the 
offences and penalty - maxima specified in that legislation. Moreover, violators who broke 
the law on purpose, especially to realise financial benefits, will face higher penalties than 
those who just had an accidental discharge. 
Firm-specific characteristics have received little attention in the theoretical literature. 
However, in the empirical literature several characteristics, such as the location of the 
firm, the firm’s size or the industry, appeared relevant (e.g. Deily and Gray, 1991).   
Political factors include, among others, the program of ruling political parties or the form 
of government in the country under consideration. Studies that take these factors into 
account are, for example, Kleit et al. (1998) and Helland (2001). However, in this paper 
we do not consider this last set of factors since the political process in Belgium is often the 
result of compromises between the different coalition parties and consequently the 
resulting political climate did not change much in the last decade
9. 
3.2 Background to the case study 
Our empirical exercise uses the jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal in Ghent (Belgium) 
for the period 1990-2000 concerning (a) discharge permits (Law on Surface Waters 1971) 
and (b) environmental permits (the discharge permit was included in the environmental 
permit due to the Decree on Environmental Permits 1985). In most cases charges were 
                                                      
9 There are of course exceptions, e.g. regulatory policy dealing with illegally built houses.   20
also filed for other violations
10. If these additional charges concerned violations of 
environmental regulations, they were included in the analysis. This is the reason why we 
also include data on the Labour Safety Law (ARAB 1946; includes a.o. an environmental 
permit) and on the Manure Decree (Meststoffendecreet 1991). Possible sentences of the 
previously mentioned regulation can be found in Table 2. The data only include 
prosecutions of persons
11.  
 
 Imprisonment  Penalty 
ARAB 1946 (since 1974) 
  Labour Safety Law 
8 days – 1 month  1.25 – 1250 EURO
12 
Wet 1971 Oppervlaktewateren 
  Law on Surface Water 
8 days – 6 months  0.65 – 125 EURO 
Milieuvergunningsdecreet 1985 
   Environmental Permit Decree 
8 days – 1 year  2.50 – 2500 EURO 
Meststoffendecreet 1991 
   Manure Decree 
8 days – 2 months 
or 8 days – 6 months 
or 8 days – 1 year 
2.50 – 1250 EURO 
or 2.50 – 1875 EURO 
or 2.50 – 2500 EURO 
Table 2: Overview of sentences 
 
3.3 Description of variables and data 
The variable we try to explain is the level of the fine pronounced following an 
environmental violation. We include 38 cases with 53 fines
13 levied. We discuss the fine 
                                                      
10 None of the cases included the restitution of illegally acquired benefits. This implies that art. 34 bis of the 
penal code does not apply.  
11 The Law on Legal responsibility of Legal Bodies 1999 was only relevant towards the end of the research 
period, as it came into force on 2 July 1999. 
12 We converted all sums from Belgian Franks to Euros and approximate the amounts to improve the ease of 
exposition. The conversion rate for BEF in Euro is 40.3399 BEF = 1 Euro. These maximal penalties do not 
include the Belgian legal correction factor (‘opdeciemen’) since this factor changes over the years.   21
levied in first instance as well as that in appeal. We immediately take the Belgian legal 
correction factor
14 (‘opdeciemen’) into account since the corrected fine is the amount with 
which the convicted party is confronted and to which it reacts.   
As was mentioned previously when we discussed the determinants of the fine level we 
distinguish three groups
15 of factors that determine the sanctioning of environmental 
crimes: environmental, legal and firm characteristics. For an overview and the definitions 
of these variables see appendix A. 
The environmental characteristics are represented by the variables DURATION and 
SERIOUS
16. Through the variable DURATION we measure the duration of the violation. 
Some criminal offences (such as the absence of an appropriate permit) could last a long 
time while others (such as an accidental point discharge) are non-recurrent. The dummy 
SERIOUS indicates whether the environmental violation ‘caused serious damage to the 
ecology’ and/or ’lead to sizeable nuisance for the surrounding community’. These phrases 
can typically be found in the written verdict, in which the violation and the motivation of 
the sanction are described.  
The legal influences we take into account are estimates of the costs for the public 
prosecutor in first instance (PPFIRST) and in appeal (PPAPPEAL). The variable TP 
                                                                                                                                                                
13 In only one case there was an effective prison sentence set. This case was excluded as an outlier from the 
analysis. Several other cases included a provisional prison sentence that was conditional on the defendant’s 
future good behaviour. This provisional prison sentence is not a substitute for defaulting on the fine. 
14 The correction factors or ‘opdeciemen’, which correct for inflation, are for the relevant time period: x80 
(Law 22 Dec 1989), x90 (Law 20 July 1991), x100 (Law 26 June 1992), x150 (Law 24 Dec 1993, for 
violations after 1 Jan 1994) and x199 (Law 24 Dec 1993, for violations after 1 Jan 1995).  
15 Remember that we choose not to consider political factors.  
16 The correlation coefficient between DURATION and SERIOUS is 0.26.    22
indicates whether there are third parties involved in the case. Moreover we take the type of 
violated legislation into consideration. We distinguish four types of legislation: Labour 
Safety Law (LSL), Environmental Permits Decree (EPD), Law on Surface Waters (LSW) 
and the Manure Decree (MD). The variables count the number of violations of one type of 
legislation. Further we also measure the influence of the compliance history through the 
variable RECORD. This 0/1-variable shows whether the accused had a criminal record or 
not. Finally, we include the variable INTENT that counts the number of aggravating 
circumstances mentioned against the defendant. They measure the intent of the 
wrongdoer. When we examine the fines imposed by the Court of Appeal, we also include 
the fine specified in first instance (FIFINE) in the analysis. 
Moreover, we also include the sector in which the defendant works in the analysis. We 
distinguish several sectors: agriculture, building industry, food industry, sand extraction, 
scrap yards, furniture industry and some others. We divided the industries into three 
groups: growing (GROW), stagnating (STEADY) and declining (DECLINE) industries. 
This division depends on the evolution of the industry’s current ratio
17, solvency ratio
18 
and the return on total assets
19. If two or more of these measures
20 increased from 1995 to 
1999, the industry is said to be growing. If none of the measures increased, the industry 
was marked as declining. Further we also observe when the prosecution was initiated. This 
is summarized in the variable PRE94 that represents whether the trial in first instance 
started before or after 1994
21. We use this variable to search for a time trend in our data.  
                                                      
17 The current ratio is obtained by dividing the total current assets by the total current liabilities. 
18 The solvency ratio is the total net worth divided by total assets.  
19 The return on total assets divides the income before interest and tax by the sum of fixed and current assets. 
20 These data were obtained from AMADEUS a European financial database. 
21 Choosing 1994 as cut-off year allows us to divide our database in two equivalent samples.   23
 
  First instance  Appeal 
  Min Max Mean Exp. 
sign 
Min Max Mean  Exp. 
sign 
FINES  
= FINE/1000 
0 12.4  3.10   0 44.6 5.08   
FINE  0  12 394.7  3 096.73   0 44 620.8  5 078.96   
DURATION  0.03 159  15.87 +  0.03 136  13.12  + 
SERIOUS  0 1  0.61 +  0 1 0.60  + 
PPFIRST  0 2  205.2  71.84 +  - - -   
PPAPPEAL  - -  -   0 97.1  48.99  + 
LSW  0 3  0.35 +  0 3 0.37  + 
EPD  0 5  1.31 +  0 5 1.29  + 
LSL  0 1  0.08 ?  0 1 0.08  ? 
MD  0 1  0.06 +  0 1 0.06  + 
OTHER  0 3  0.51   0 3 0.48   
TP  0 1  0.24 +  0 1 0.23  + 
RECORD  0 1  0.04 +  0 1 0.04  + 
INTENT  0 1  0.67 +  0 1 0.67  + 
FIFINE  - -  -   0 99.2  5.09  + 
GROW  0 1  0.31 +  0 1 0.35  + 
STEADY  0 1  0.26 0  0 1 0.23  0 
DECLINE  0 1  0.43 -  0 1 0.42  - 
PRE94  0 1  0.28 -  0 1 0.29  - 
Number of 
obs. N 
51   52  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and expected signs 
We perform two estimations: one for the verdict in first instance and one for the appeal. 
The selection of the independent variables is slightly different. The descriptive statistics of 
the selected variables (minimum, maximum and mean) can be found in Table 3.     24
3.4 Expected results 
We now discuss briefly the expected signs of the different variables. A summary can be 
found in Table 3.  
Hypothesis 1 deduced from our game-theoretical analysis states that serious violators 
should be punished more harshly than minor violators. We can assume that longer 
violations (which are usually more serious) will be punished more severely. We, therefore, 
expect the coefficient connected to DURATION to be positive. We also anticipate a 
positive coefficient for the variable SERIOUS which indicates if there was serious damage 
or nuisance caused by the infringement. Andreoni (1991) also finds that optimal fines 
should rise with the severity of the infraction, that is, the penalty should ‘fit the crime’. 
Hypothesis 2 asserts that the optimal fine increases with the costs of public prosecution. 
Other existing models, e.g. Polinsky and Shavell (1992), also state that the optimal fine 
should rise with the enforcement costs. Therefore, we expect the variables PPFIRST, 
PPAPPEAL to show a positive sign.   
For each type of violated legislation, we take the maximum allowable sentences (see 
Table 2) into account. We find that penalties imposed for violating the Law on Surface 
Waters (LSW) cannot be higher than 125 Euro, times the legal correction factor, while 
those pronounced for violating the Environmental Permit Decree (EPD) or the Manure 
Decree (MD) can amount to 2500 Euro, times the legal correction factor. As a result, we 
expect a positive sign for EPD, MD and LSL.   
We also consider the impact of having third parties represented at the trial. We assume 
that the coefficient of TP is positive. The presence of third parties, after all, implies that 
the violation was potentially more damaging to human beings.   25
Next we expect that a violator with a criminal record will be more heavily punished 
(Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 1991). Following the literature on state-dependent enforcement, 
which started with Landsberger and Meilijson (1982), the optimal enforcement scheme 
should depend on the defendant’s violation record (for an environmental application, see 
Harrington, 1988). Therefore, we expect the variable RECORD to have a positive sign. 
We also assume that the variable INTENT will show a positive sign. Deliberate violators 
should be punished more stringently than accidental violators.  
We assume that the fine in appeal will be higher if the fine (represented by the variable 
FIFINE) in first instance was higher. FIFINE has therefore a positive expected sign. 
Next we consider the industry variables GROW, STEADY and DECLINE. The enforcer 
is assumed to take the defendant’s ability-to-pay into account when deciding on the level 
of the fine. The focus is on the relative impact on profits rather than on the nominal level 
of the sanction. Firms from less prosperous industries will, for this reason, face less 
stringent penalties than wealthier ones. Previous economic research has established that 
regulations favour struggling industries and slower-growing regions (Deily and Gray, 
1991). The regulator is thought to be sensitive to the potential political costs of the trade-
off between pollution control and employment. This strand of the literature, therefore, 
deems it likely that the regulator’s enforcement decisions are influenced by this political 
trade-off. However, we think that these political considerations have only a limited impact 
on the judge’s sanctioning decision compared to the influence of the defendant’s ability-
to-pay. In conclusion, we expect the sign of GROW to be positive and that of DECLINE 
to be negative.    
For the variable that represents the time trend (PRE94), we expect a negative sign. 
Environmental awareness has increased considerably during the nineties. The explosive   26
growth of environmental legislation since mid nineties confirms this. We assume that this 
development has resulted in a more stringent enforcement of infractions. 
3.5 Estimation method 
We estimate the penalty function via the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS). The 
linear regression model equals: 
  0 Ybb Xε = ++  (6) 
with Y the dependent variable, b0 the constant, X the vector of independent variables, b the 
regression coefficients and ε the error term. The variables we include in our two models 
can be found in Table 3.  
We cannot estimate a semilog or loglinear specification since our dependent and most of 
the independent variables contain zeroes (see descriptive statistics in Table 3).  
3.6 Results 
As mentioned before we estimate two separate models: the penalty function for the first 
instance and that for the appeal. Estimating the penalty function for the joint dataset or as 
a panel set had a very low explanatory power and did not allow us to draw any significant 
conclusions. We discuss in turn the results for both first instance and appeal.  
3.6.1 First instance 
The results of the estimation with White or heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
can be found in Table 4. We obtain an adjusted R²-value of approximately 20 percent. 
Next we discuss the three groups of determinants we distinguished: environmental, legal 
and industry factors.     27
The influence of environmental factors on the level of the fine was measured through the 
duration of the violation (DURATION) and the presence of serious damage (SERIOUS). 
Unfortunately both variables were not significant and this does not allow us to comment 
on our theoretical finding that more serious crime should be punished more severely.  
 
Specification 1  Specification 2   
 Coefficient p-value   Coefficient p-value 
(Constant)  * 1.352  0.0583    0.440 0.7603 
DURATION        -0.008 0.5286 
SERIOUS         0.022 0.9798 
PPFIRST         0.0017 0.1486 
TP         1.498 0.2881 
INTENT         0.022 0.7961 
RECORD  *** 7.177  0.0015  *** 7.655 0.0021 
LSL         2.438 0.2552 
EPD  ** 0.924  0.0424 **  1.131 0.0285 
MD  * 4.229  0.0719  *  3.248 0.0751 
DECLINE         0.686 0.4670 
PRE94         -1.220 0.2162 
R² = 0.267 
Adj. R² = 0.220 
F-stat = 5.70 (***) 
R² = 0.367 
Adj. R² = 0.188 
F-stat = 2.05 (**) 
 
N = 51 
Dependent variable: FINES = FINE/1000 
*/**/*** = significant at 10% / 5% / 1% level 
Table 4: Estimation results for first instance 
The legal influences included in the analysis take the type of violated legislation into 
account (LSL, EPD, LSW and MD). Here we can distinguish differences in the 
sanctioning of the Environmental Permit Decree (EPD – significant at 5% level) and the 
Manure Decree (MD – significant at 10% level) compared with other legislation. The fine 
is higher if these particular decrees are violated. Infractions of the Manure Decree often   28
coincided with infractions of the Law on Surface Waters; e.g. illegal disposal of manure in 
surface waters. However, in these circumstances, the judge refers to the legislation with 
the highest maximum sanction
22, which is the MD rather than the LSW (see table 2). 
The variable RECORD, measuring the influence of the defendant’s compliance history, is 
significant at the 1 % level and positive. The presence of a criminal record increases the 
fine with more than 7000 Euro.  
Firm-specific factors and the time variable PRE94 were not significant. The increasing 
environmental awareness does not appear to influence the fines levied in first instance. 
3.6.2 Court of Appeal 
In Belgium the Court of Appeal reviews the case in its entirety and allows new evidence 
to be brought forward (Declercq, 1999). If the judge in appeal finds the defendant liable, 
then the fine of first instance is taken as a reference point in the sanctioning decision. This 
is why we include FIFINE as an explanatory variable. 
The results of the estimation for the Court of Appeal in Ghent, using White or 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, can be found in Table 5. The adjusted R²-
value of this estimation is quite high. We could explain more than 73 percent of the 
variance in the dependent variable. We discuss the three groups of determinants of the 
sanctioning of environmental crimes: environmental, legal and firm factors. 
The estimation results show remarkably different judging behaviour in the Court of 
Appeal compared to the judging decisions in the courts of first instance
23. None of the 
                                                      
22 Art. 65 al. 1 Penal Code. 
23 The Court of Appeal in Gent is responsible for the appeals from the different courts of first instance: the 
courts of Oudenaarde, Ghent, Ieper, Brugge, Kortrijk and Dendermonde.   29
variables that influence the fine set in first instance are significant for the appeal case since 
these variables have been captured by FIFINE. However, some other variables turn out to 
be significant and influence the fine set in appeal. These results imply that other aspects of 
a case are considered in appeal than in first instance. 
 
Specification 1  Specification 2   
 Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
(Constant)   0.8426 0.3849    1.350  0.4821 
FIFINE  *** 0.444  0.0000 ***  0.432 0.0000 
DURATION         -0.015  0.5141 
SERIOUS         1.542  0.2272 
PPAPPEAL         -0.0066  0.7168 
TP  ** 5.090  0.0150  **  5.509  0.0140 
INTENT  ** 1.173  0.0343  **  1.216  0.0358 
RECORD         3.096  0.1658 
LSL         -1.266  0.5169 
EPD         -0.315  0.6421 
LSW   -0.802 0.1178  *  -1.076  0.0839 
MD         -1.047  0.3689 
DECLINE         -1.077  0.3730 
PRE94  ** -2.383  0.0454  *  -2.385  0.0977 
R² = 0.778 
Adj R² = 0.754 
F-test = 32.27 (***) 
R² = 0.801 
Adj R² = 0.733 
F-test = 11.78 (***) 
 
N = 51 
Dependent variable: FINES = FINE/1000 
* / ** / *** = significant at 10% / 5% / 1% level 
Table 5: Estimation results for appeal 
Again the variables measuring the duration of the violation (DURATION) and the 
significance of the damage caused (SERIOUS) were not significant.    30
Among the legal factors we now find that the variable TP, which represents the presence 
of third parties, is positive and significant at the 5 % level. If third parties are present, the 
fine after the appeal will be approximately 5000 to 5500 Euros higher. Damage caused to 
the well-being and property of human beings is taken seriously. Moreover, we take the 
legislation that was violated into account (LSL, EPD, LSW and MD). In this model the 
coefficients are insignificant except for the coefficient of the Law on Surface Water 
(LSW) which is negative and significant at the 10% level for the second model 
specification. We see here the influence of the low maximal fine which is allowed under 
the LSW (see table 2). 
Next we measure the influence of the defendant’s compliance history through the variable 
RECORD. This variable turns out to be insignificant in appeal. The variable INTENT 
representing the number of aggravating circumstances is now, in contrast to the first 
estimation results, significant at the 5 % level. The sign of the coefficient was positive as 
expected. A very important explanatory variable is without a doubt the fine that was 
imposed in first instance (FIFINE). The size of this fine is directly and positively related 
to the one pronounced in appeal. 
The variable PRE94, however, is significant and negative. Apparently, the increasing 
environmental awareness during the nineties has resulted in a more stringent enforcement 
of infractions at the appeal level. 
3.7 Discussion of the results 
The optimal fine we derive in section 2 allows us to formulate some testable hypotheses. 
At first sight, we cannot accept our first hypothesis: actual fines increase with the size of 
the infringement. However, in the studied environmental jurisdiction the seriousness of the   31
violation is taken into account, in an indirect way, through the legislation which is taken 
into consideration by the judge. The Environmental Permit Decree, the only legislative 
text to be significant at a 5% level, is one of the most relevant legislative texts. This 
implies that the commonly used modelling assumption of a fine independent of the harm 
caused by incompliance is not likely to be acceptable. 
Our results imply that we can neither accept nor reject our second hypothesis ‘fines 
increase with the costs of the public prosecutor’.  
The estimation results reveal some other observations, which are more or less in line with 
our expectations.  
  Firstly, we notice that the judging decisions in the Court of Appeal are based on 
different characteristics than the judging behaviour in the courts of first instance. The 
judges of the Court of Appeal take the intentions of the violator into consideration as 
well as the harm caused to third parties. Higher courts tend to preserve the core 
principles and values of the laws submitted to them. The backbone of our criminal law 
is a criminal code from 1867, centred around 19
th century ideas of guilt as the reason 
for punishment and of the necessity to limit the ius puniendi to essentials, mainly the 
integrity of the human life and being and the protection of individual property. It is 
very interesting to note that this rationale, a typical criminal law rationale, surfaces in 
our results. Criminal courts are and remain houses of criminal law, not of 
environmental law. The instrumental logic behind the use of fines matters. Our results 
suggest fining practices regarding environmental crime by criminal courts on the one 
hand and environmental administrations on the other hand might be structurally bound 
to be different in the factors that determine the fine level.    32
  Looking at the legal factors, we would first like to mention the large influence of the 
fine pronounced in first instance on the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeal 
(variable FIFINE).  
Considering the regulation that was violated, the results for the Environmental Permit 
Decree of 1985 (EPD) and the Manure Decree 1991 (MD) are noteworthy. Breaches of 
these decrees are sanctioned more severely at the first instance than violations of other 
regulations.  
It was also interesting to see the positive influence of third parties on the level of the 
fine. This implies that the sanction in appeal is influenced by the harm caused to other 
people. After analysing the jurisprudence under consideration, the damage consisted 
mostly of nuisance to neighbours (noise, stench, dust… and also visual hindrance) but 
also purely material damage was described (e.g. damage to grazing lands making it 
temporarily unfit for grazing). The fact that the fine is positively influenced by damage 
caused to the well-being of and property owned by the neighbourhood, is also 
interesting when looking at the critique made on the anthropocentrism which 
characterises, mainly older, environmental legislation.  This discussion encompasses a 
fraction which stresses that the environment should be protected as an independent 
value. This trend challenges the protection of the environment focused on the support 
of human beings and public health. Our results show that, in practice, the protection of 
public health and private property still plays a central role in the sanctioning decision.   
Considering the variables related to the defendant, we find that the influence of a 
criminal record (variable RECORD) is really important while the influence of the 
defendant’s state of mind (variable INTENT) is smaller. Obviously the absence or 
presence of a criminal record provides the judge with a trustworthy signal about the   33
citizenship of the violator. The less objective variable INTENT scored significant in 
the appeal case. Fewer monetary consequences are associated with the variable 
INTENT. This topic could certainly benefit from additional legal research. 
  The fact that none of the sector variables DECLINE turns out to be significant 
prohibits us to comment on the role of the violator’s ability-to-pay plays in the 
sanctioning decision.  
  Furthermore, the analysis of the variable PRE94 was as we expected. The positive 
coefficient in appeal implies that cases that went to court before 1994 were punished 
less severely. 
Even if the maximum fine in appeal is much smaller than the one in first instance, the 
level of the average fine in appeal is higher than that in first instance (see Table 3, variable 
FINE). The question of the appropriateness of going in appeal certainly arises.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We have studied the determinants of the level of criminal fines. The criminal fine is an 
important enforcement instrument for environmental regulations. Using a game theoretical 
model we find that the equilibrium fine level is expected to depend on the harm caused by 
the violation, the costs to the government and the probability that the guilty party will be 
punished. Subsequently, we test these hypotheses with actual court decisions.   
In our empirical analysis, lack of data did not allow us to examine the influence of the 
court costs or the probability that the guilty party will be punished on the level of the fine. 
However, we are able to empirically check two other hypotheses. We find that, in an   34
indirect way, actual fines increase with the seriousness of the violation. However, we were 
unable to corroborate the hypothesis that fines increase with the public prosecutor’s costs.  
Our analysis also reveals some more characteristics regarding the fining practice. For 
example, the results show that the violator’s compliance history influences the level of the 
fine. Violators with a criminal record have a significantly higher probability of receiving a 
higher penalty. The absence or presence of a criminal record is used by the judge as an 
objective signal of the civil responsibility of the violator.  
Finally, we would like to point out that our sample size is relatively small and we lacked 
the necessary data to correct for the sample selection bias. This is an important caveat 
when discussing our results. 
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APPENDIX A – Definition of the variables 
 
Variables Description 
Dependent variable 
FINES  Fine pronounced in first instance or in appeal 
Independent variables 
Environmental 
DURATION  Duration of violation (in months) 
SERIOUS (0/1)  = 1 if serious damage or nuisance was caused 
Legal factors 
PPFIRST  Costs for public prosecutor caused by court case in first instance 
PPAPPEAL  Costs for public prosecutor caused by appeal 
LSW   Charges within scope of Law on Surface Waters 
EPD   Charges within scope of Environmental Permit Decree 
LSL   Charges within scope of Labour Safety Law (ARAB) 1946 
MD  Charges within scope of Manure Decree 
OTHER  Charges within other laws 
TP (0/1)  = 1 if third parties are involved in the law suit 
RECORD (0/1)  = 1 if the defendant has a criminal record 
INTENT   State of mind of defendant (number of negative aspects) 
FIFINE  Fine pronounced in first instance 
Firm factors 
GROW (0/1)  = 1 if the defendant works in a growing industry 
STEADY (0/1)  = 1 if the defendant works in a stagnating industry  
DECLINE (0/1)  = 1 if the defendant works in a declining industry 
Other 
PRE94 (0/1)  = 1 if the case started in first instance before 1994 
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